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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the foundations of the criminal justice system is the principle 
that a defendant’s guilt may be decided only by those appointed by law to
determine it,1 and that decision should be based only on admissible evidence 
presented in court.2 Another basic principle is that the legal system must 
take steps to ensure that any evidence before the court is reliable and reflective of
factual reality.3 
Media publications about an ongoing legal proceeding which report 
more than the events in court may undermine these two central principles. 
Media publication of testimonies not yet been heard by the court, such as 
stories from eyewitnesses who are not supposed to testify, or of other
evidence which has not yet been presented (and may never be presented)
in court, may influence the memories of future witnesses concerning events, 
making it less likely their witness testimony reflects reality. 
Such publications are likely to influence the decision-making process
of the judges as well, causing judges to likely determine a defendant’s
guilt based on “evidence” coming from the media.4 Thus, media publications 
may impinge on a defendant’s presumption of innocence and his or her 
right to a fair trial, thereby endangering their freedom.5 Media publications
can also impinge upon societal interests to maintain a fair and just criminal
justice system.
However, these important interests must be balanced against other important 
principles and interests. The most important competing principle is freedom 
1. See, e.g., European Convention of Human Rights, art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950 [hereinafter 
ECHR] [https://perma.cc/78Q9-S7DM]. See also U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.).
2. ADRIAN KEANE & PAUL MCKEOWN, THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE 2 (10th 
ed. 2014); U.S. Const. amend. VI, Sanhedrin, 6b (“a judge may evaluate only what his
eyes see.”) [https://perma.cc/TXZ6-SPHH].  For an example under Israeli law, see CrimA 21/72 
Mordechai Zeiger v. State of Israel 26 (1) PD 505 (1973), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.), https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_word/elyon/KF-1-505-L.pdf 
#xml=http://www.nevo.co.il/Handlers/Highlighter/PdfHighlighter.ashx?index=0&type=
Main [perma.cc/6WSC-M4NV]; File No. 10563-06 CA (Jer.) Yaakov Neimi v. Elav Ofna Ltd.
et al. (Mar. 8, 2011), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) [perma.cc/ 
E2EJ-DWY5]. 
3. For an overview see Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial
Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357 (1985); Keane & McKeown,
supra note 2, at 2–5. 
4. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Loftus, Make-Believe Memories, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 867, 
867 (2003).
5. Nancy Mehrkens Steblay, Jasmina Besirevic, Solomon M. Fulero & Belia
Jimenez-Lorente, The Effects of Pretrial Publicity on Juror Verdicts: A Meta-Analytic Review, 23 
L. & HUM. BEHAV. 219, 220 (1999). 
40
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of speech, which is the central basis of every democratic society,6 and 
therefore enjoys constitutional protection in most countries.7 A second
principle is public trial, which guarantees that justice is conducted publicly.8 
Limitations on media publications of ongoing legal proceeding has
been a topic of interest in the Western world since the birth of modern
journalism. Accordingly, all Western countries have some version of the 
sub judice rule. However, in the last few decades, as various forms of
electronic media have increased the coverage of court proceedings, and as 
“objective journalism” has lost much of its luster and prestige, the chance
of undue influence in criminal proceedings have increased. This raises the 
need to redraw the boundaries of legitimate media coverage of criminal 
proceedings. 
Even though the need to strike a balance regarding the permissible news 
coverage of criminal proceedings is common to all Western systems of 
justice, the specific boundaries are bound to be influenced by local factors,
which can obviously change over time: the local society and culture; the 
identity of the decision-makers in criminal cases (judges or jurors); the 
legal and constitutional environment; and the media’s local traditions. 
For example, the Supreme Court of the United States found in the 
Sheppard case that the defendant had not received a fair trial for the
murder of his wife due to the overwhelming wave of negative publicity 
the case received in the media.9 A “carnival atmosphere” accompanied the
proceedings and prevented the defendant from receiving a fair trial, and
therefore the Supreme Court held that he was entitled to a retrial.10 
Nevertheless, the ruling noted that this was a “palliative” measure; reversing 
the conviction and ordering a new trial was only a temporary measure, as
 6. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also ECHR art. 10.
 7. See JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY, 31 (2011); JAVIER CREMADES, DAS GRUNDRECHT
DER MEINUNGSFREIHEIT IN DER SPANISCHEN CERFASSUNG, 173 (1994); Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (stating “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the market.”); R. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t Ex parte Simms 
[2000] 2 A.C. 115 HL, 126. 
8. ECHR, supra note 1, at art. 10; Courts Law (Consolidated Version), 5744-1984, 
1123 LSI 198, § 68 (1984) (Isr.).
9.  Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966). 
10. Id.  Recently, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals overturned the conviction
and death sentence of Lam Luong for murdering his four children due to the prejudicial 
nature of local media coverage, ordering a retrial and change of venue.  Luong v. State,
199 So. 3d 98 (2013).  On March 14, 2014, the Alabama Supreme Court ruled 5-3 to reverse 
the Court of Criminal Appeals’ ruling.  Luong v. State, 199 So. 3d 139 (2014). Similarly,
see Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
 41
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a cure would require steps to prevent prejudice (sub judice publications) at
the start, namely appropriate regulation to protect legal proceeding from 
invalid external influences. 
But we must remember that reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those
remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception. The courts 
must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their processes from
prejudicial outside interferences. Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the 
accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming under the jurisdiction of
the court should be permitted to frustrate its function. Collaboration between
counsel and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is
not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary
measures.11 
Over the past few years, a relatively large number of cases have arisen
in Israel, in which media publications have allegedly influenced criminal 
proceedings. The Supreme Court of Israel has issued a number of inconsistent 
decisions regarding such publications.
In this Article, we will study the sub judice prohibition, analyze the concern
of undue influence of media publications in criminal cases in light of
contemporary behavioral literature, discuss the various approaches found
in contemporary Israeli case law, and propose a new and better model. 
II. COMPARATIVE LAW AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The sub judice rule aims to protect the defendants’ rights for due process
and a fair trial, while balancing them with other rights and interests such 
as freedom of speech and public trial. Its purpose is to prevent a defendant 
from being tried by the media rather than those who were ordained to do
so, by forbidding the media from reporting anything that might influence 
an ongoing proceeding. As mentioned above, every democratic country
has a version of the sub judice rule. 
The sub judice prohibition protects a number of basic interests. The first is
the defendants’ constitutional right to a fair trial, and their constitutional right
to a presumption of innocence, as their freedom should not be surrendered until 
they are found guilty by a court of law based upon admissible evidence. A
second interest is the purity of the criminal proceeding. This interest is not 
only the interest of the defendant, but also the interest of the entire justice
system and society as a whole––the interest that criminal proceedings cannot
be influenced by external publications. This interest is compromised by
publications to the benefit and detriment of the defendant. 
11.  Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966) (emphasis added). 
42
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On the other hand, another basic right in a democratic society is freedom
of speech.12 Free speech is one of the most fundamental human rights and
is essential for human self-fulfillment.13 Moreover, free speech furthers the
marketplace of ideas and helps discover hidden facts.14 Free speech is an
essential part of the democratic process, allowing the balance between stability
and change in a democratic society.15 In Israel, free speech is applicable to
every expression, even though it may be balanced against other values.16 
There are substantial differences between different countries concerning 
the sub judice doctrine.17  The doctrine is influenced by the vigorousness 
of the defense given to free speech as well as by the meaning and significance
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  As for the importance of free speech in Israel, see CA
409/13 Keshet Broadcasting v. Cooper 2 (Apr. 11, 2013) (unpublished), Nevo Legal Database
(by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/13/090/004/s05/13004090. 
s05.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JF5-VT4A] for the ruling of Justice Hayut.  Dep. Pres. Rivlin 
expands on this in CA 751/10 Ploni v. Dayan-Orbach, 61–66, 73–82 (Feb. 8, 2012) (unpublished). 
See also Mordechai Kremnitzer, Khalid Ghanayim & Boaz Shnoor, Libel Law: De Lege 
Lata and De Lege Ferenda (Jerusalem: Harry and Michael Sacher Institute, Hebrew University
of Jerusalem 2005) at 61–64, 200–04. 
13. FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A THEORETICAL ENQUIRY 47–72 (1982); 
ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 14–20 (1985); C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY 
AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 6–25 (1989).  In regard to Israeli case law, see HCJ 73/53 Kol 
Ha’am v. Minister of Interior 83(7) PD 871, 878 (1953) (Isr.); RUTH GAVISON, HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN ISRAEL 116 (1994); RE’EM SEGEV & M. KREMNITZER, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
AGAINST GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES 85–91 (2001); Guy Pessach, Freedom of Speech
and the Legal Foundations of the Press, 31 HEBREW UNIV. L. REV.–MISHPATIM 895, 909–11
(2001).
14. JOHN MILTON, COMPLETE PROSE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON 492 (E. Sirluck ed. 
Vol. II 1959); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). Pessach, supra note 13,
at 897–901. 
15. BARENDT, supra note 13, at 18–20; Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and
Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 486 (2011); James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy 
as the Central Value of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 497 (2011); 
DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, FREE SPEECH AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY 18–22 (1999).  As for 
this justification in Israel, see Pessach supra note 13, at 901–08; CA 751/10, Ploni v.
Dayan-Orbach 62 (Feb. 8, 2012) (Isr.) (unpublished); CrimA 214/89 State of Israel v. Ben-
Moshe 22(2) PD 427, 435 (1968) (Isr.); Kremnitzer, Ghanayim & Shnoor, supra note 12, 
at 202. 
16.  CA 214/89 Avneri v. Shapira 43(3) PD 840, 857–59 (1989), Nevo Legal Database 
(by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.), https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_word/elyon/padi-nb-3-840­
l.pdf#xml=http://www.nevo.co.il/Handlers/Highlighter/PdfHighlighter.ashx?index=0&ty
pe=Main [https://perma.cc/LM66-T3DV].
17. See infra IV.  As for the viewpoint of Israeli jurisprudence, see CA 409/13 Keshet 
Broadcasting v. Cooper 4–8 (Apr. 11, 2013) (unpublished), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription,
in Hebrew) (Isr.), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/13/090/004/s05/13004090.s05.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/5JF5-VT4A], for Justice Solberg’s ruling where Solberg notes three main approaches.
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given to the presumption of innocence. The presumption of innocence in 
Continental law developed alongside the presumption of innocence in 
common law, but in each system, this principle has its own meaning, and 
the distinction affects the scope of permitted publications during legal 
proceedings.18 
In common law, the presumption of innocence is only an evidentiary
principle, placing upon the prosecution the obligation to prove guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt. On the other hand, in the Continental system, the axiom 
that every person is innocent until proven guilty is a substantial presumption 
which precludes any sanction before conviction.19 Inter alia, it forbids any 
publications which indicate a person’s guilt before they have been convicted.20 
The need to preserve the presumption of innocence of defendants requires 
limiting publications that concern the possibility a certain person has committed
a crime. Therefore publications which allude to a certain person having 
committed a crime, including statements of a person suspected of having 
done so,21 must be limited by the need to protect the individual’s presumption
of innocence.22 
In American law, under the First Amendment, the press23 is free to publish 
harsh statements about suspects and the processes of investigation and 
prosecution, even though such publications may impinge not only on the
18. For a historical survey, see Rinat Kitai, The Importance of a Positive Presumption 
of Innocence, Its Role and Its Nature at Pre-Trial Stages 3; ALEI MISHPAT 405, 408–13 (2003). 
19. Id. at 433–35. In French jurisprudence in the last few decades of the twentieth
century, reforms were instituted to strengthen and buttress the viewing of the presumption
of innocence as an essential determination with significant ramifications.  For a description 
of French legal reform, see Francois Quintard-Morénas, The Presumption of Innocence in 
the French and Anglo-American Legal Traditions, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 107, 136–41 (2010).
20. For a description of the difference between the various legal systems and a call 
to adopt a broader definition, see Quintard-Morénas, supra note 19. 
21. Id. at 138 n.289. 
22. See CODE DE PROCEDURE. PÉNALE [C. PR. PÉN.] [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE]
prelim. art. 3 (Fr.) (“Every person suspected or charged is presumed innocent until their
guilt has been established.  Infringements on their presumption of innocence are proscribed, 
compensated and punished in accordance with the law.”).  Translation based on Quintard-
Morénas, supra note 19, at n.292. 
23. Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).  The prohibition on 
limiting freedom of speech of course relates to private individuals, not just the media.
Nevertheless, courts often issue gag orders relating to a specific person, who is not a party
to the proceedings, to prevent him or her from discussing matters relating to the proceedings, 
to avoid the danger of interference in the judicial procedure (and not in order to defend the 
dignity of the subjects of the publication).  For a description of a case in which such an
order is issued, as well as the argument that such orders are unconstitutional or at the very
least must be highly restricted, see Michael D. Seplow & Paul L. Hoffman, Punishing Pundits: 
People v. Dyleski and the Gag Order as Prior Restraint in High-Profile Cases, 39 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1197 (2006). 
44
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dignity of the accused, but on the legal proceedings and the defendant’s
right to a fair trial.24 
The United Kingdom’s 1981 Contempt of Court Act proclaims that any
media publication which significantly discusses pending legal proceedings to
the extent that justice is endangered will be considered to have the intent
of influencing a court proceeding and will incur criminal liability on the 
grounds of contempt of court.25 A publication is considered to pose such 
a threat if it “creates a substantial risk that the course of justice in the
proceedings in question will be seriously impeded or prejudiced.”26 Section 
4 states that “the court may, where it appears to be necessary for avoiding 
a substantial risk of prejudice to the administration of justice in those 
proceedings” postpone such a publication “for such period as the court
thinks necessary for that purpose.”27 
At first, the court set a low threshold for applying this rule, so that only 
publications that pose minimal risks of severely influencing the legal
proceedings are exempt from the application of the law,28 whereas theoretical 
or distant risks would not incur liability.29 However, later it was determined
that the risk of jurors learning of the publication and the influence of the 
publication on the jurors must be determined both at the time of the
publication and during trial.30 In practice, this ruling severely limited the
possibility of issuing gag orders and as a result, prosecution no longer sought
them.31 This situation was criticized and in response, the Law Commission
24. As for the situation in the American legal system and criticism of it, see Mark
J. Geragos, The Thirteenth Juror: Media Coverage of Supersized Trials, 39 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1167 (2006).  Geragos discusses the serious influence of media reports on defendants’
right to a fair trial when the press takes an interest.  He suggests that the United States
adopt the contempt laws of the United Kingdom, allowing suits to be brought against 
media for publications that impinge on defendants’ rights.  See also Gavin Phillipson, Trial 
by Media: The Betrayal of the First Amendment’s Purpose, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 15–29 
(2008); Stephen J. Krause, Punishing the Press: Using Contempt of Court to Secure the 
Right to a Fair Trial, 76 B.U. L. REV. 537, 559–61 (1996). 
25. Section 1 of the Act states that “‘the strict liability rule’ means the rule of law 
whereby conduct may be treated as a contempt of court as tending to interfere with the 
course of justice in particular legal proceedings regardless of intent to do so.”  Contempt 
of Court Act 1981, c. 49, § 1 (U.K.). 
26. Id. § 2.
27.  Contempt of Court Act 1981, c. 49, § 4 (U.K.). 
28. See A-G v. English [1983] 1 A.C. (HL) 116 at 141–42 (Eng.).
29. A-G v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 3) [1992] 1 W.L.R. 874 (D.C.) at 881 (Eng.). 
30.  A-G v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd. [1997] 1 All E.R. 456 at 356 (Eng.).
31. Ian Cram & Nick Taylor, The Law Commission’s contempt proposals–getting
the balance right?, 6 CRIM. L. REV. 465, 471 (2013).
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issued a consultation paper recommending strengthening the ability to
indict individuals for publicizing a legal proceeding without changing the
law.32 British courts sometimes issue non-disclosure orders in defamation 
suits and in suits claiming misuse of private information.33 Such orders may
include a ban on publicizing the slander itself, as well as ban on publicizing 
the existence of the slander suit or the request for a non-disclosure order 
(a super-injunction).34 
In Australia35 and Canada,36 the rules of sub judice are essentially the same
as those in the United Kingdom, meaning a gag order will be issued to maintain 
the purity of a legal proceeding, if the balance of interests is in favor of the
applicant. 
In France and other Continental countries,37 the possibility of publicizing 
events in criminal courts is restricted by the essential presumption of
innocence.38  This means that the press is forbidden from publishing any 
publication which might portray alleged perpetrators as guilty prior to 
conviction.39 
The European Court of Human Rights has also maintained in a number
of cases that media publications which portray alleged perpetrators as 
guilty prior to conviction, whether published by independent media or by
governmental authorities, are a violation of defendants’ human rights.40
 32. LAW COMMISSION, CONTEMPT OFCOURT:ACONSULTATIONPAPER(2012), Consultation 
Paper No. 209 (U.K.), http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/app/uploads/2015/03/cp209_contempt_of_ 
court.pdf [http://perma.cc/4P7S-BZ7Z].  A final recommendation regarding the relevant issues,
has not yet been published. 
33. Alastair Mullis & Richard Parkes, Gatley on Libel and Slander 974–78 (12th 
ed. 2013). 
34. Id. at 970–71. 
35. John Fairfax and Sons Pty. Ltd. v. McRae, (1955) 93 CLR 351 (Austl.); Attorney
Gen v. John Fairfax & Sons Ltd. [1980] 1 NSWLR 362, 38 (Austl.). 
36.  Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 (Can.). 
37. Giorgio Resta, Trying Cases in the Media: A Comparative Overview, 71 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 41 (2008). 
38. “Everyone has the right to the respect of the presumption of innocence. Where, 
before any sentence, a person is publicly shown as being guilty of facts under inquiries or
preliminary investigation, the court, even by interim order and without prejudice to compensation
for the injury suffered, may prescribe any measures, such as the insertion of a rectification 
or the publication of a communiqué, in order to put an end to the infringement of the
presumption of innocence, at the expense of the individual or legal entity liable for that 
infringement.” CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 9-1 (Fr.); Quintard-Morénas, supra
note 19, at 140 n.313.
 39. Quintard-Morénas, supra note 19, at 140–41.
40. Allenet de Ribemont v. France, 308 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 38 (1995); Du Roy
and Malaurie v. France, 2000-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 34. 
46
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In Israel, the sub judice prohibition is found in Section 71(a) of 
the Courts Law, 5744-1984. The section was amended in 2002 to limit the 
scope of the offense to criminal proceedings and to add a mental element
requirement.41 In its current iteration,42 the law states:
A person shall not publish anything concerning a criminal matter pending in court 
if the publication has the power to influence the course or outcome of the trial, 
with the intention of creating such an influence; and the anticipation of such an
influence as almost certain, is equivalent to intent.
The 2002 amendment was the result of criticism that claimed the previous
version excessively silenced freedom of speech and was utterly unnecessary
to protect the proceedings of the court.43 
One concern about the sub judice prohibition is that media publication 
might influence judges’ decision-making. However, Israeli legislation and
case law tend to assume that inadmissible evidence, including media
publications, presented to judges has a possible negligible effect on them.
Thus, the Evidence Ordinance sets out that the fact that a court is exposed 
to inadmissible evidence does not disqualify it from adjudicating the case,
but it allows disqualifying the verdict if the judge was influenced by the 
invalid evidence to the extent of ruling in accordance with it.44 
Case law interpreted this provision narrowly, stating that usually a
professional judge can disassociate himself from the influence of invalid 
evidence. Therefore, the judge’s exposure to invalid evidence does not 
affect the conclusions he reaches, and naturally such exposure should not 
41.  Courts Law (amended), 5762-2002, § 41(a) (2002) (Isr.). 
42. Before the amendment, the relevant portion read: “A person shall not publish 
anything concerning a matter pending in any court if the publication is intended to influence the
course or outcome of the trial.”  Courts Law (Consolidated Version), 5744-1984, § 71(a), 
38 LSI 271 (1983-1984) (as amended) (Isr.).
43. See Ze’ev Segal, Lifting the Prohibition to Publish on Grounds of Sub-Judice:
A Proposal for an Alternative Arrangement, 1984 BAR-ILAN L. STUD. 105 (1984). 
44. “When evidence which is not admissible as proof of a criminal charge has been
admitted by error or inadvertence, such evidence shall not be used in proof of the charge
nor shall any judgment be based thereon; nevertheless, the fact that such evidence has been 
heard by the court shall not invalidate the judgment unless, in the opinion of the court, the 
accused would not have been convicted if such evidence had not been given or there was 
no other sufficient evidence to support conviction apart from that evidence.”  Evidence 
Ordinance [New Version], 5731-1971, ¶ 56, 2 LSI 198 (1968-72) (Isr.) (emphasis added). 
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invalidate the verdict.45 Moreover, case law determined that even if a judge
may be exposed to invalid evidence, once told to ignore it, a judge should
be able to do so.46 Similarly, the judges’ professionalism and expertise
hypothesis led the courts to rule that exposure to invalid evidence does not 
justify disqualifying a judge, except in the most extreme circumstances.47 
Another relevant issue is that Israeli case law tends not to grant restraining 
orders against media publications for the tort of libel.48 In practice, the
rulings of the Supreme Court do not allow restraining orders even in cases
where the subject is not a classic public figure or if there are serious doubts 
concerning the publication’s truth.49 
Therefore, in the next chapter, we will review some Israeli cases concerning 
massive media coverage of both public and nonpublic figures and the 
possible influences on the outcomes of the cases. 
45. In Abitbol v. State of Israel, the court ruled that in order to invalidate a verdict
given after the judge was exposed to invalid evidence, the appeal must show that there is 
no valid evidence to support the verdict, or the court of appeals must be convinced that the 
judge ruled as they did only because of the invalid evidence.  DNP 199/94 Abitbol v. State 
of Israel 51(2) PD 1 (1996) (Isr.).  The case notes that only in rare circumstances may it 
be determined that invalid evidence has in fact influenced the court. Id.
 46. Id. at 14–16.  This verdict does not dovetail with other research literature. See
Chanan Goldschmidt & Yaakov Schul, Difficulties in disregarding information – psychology 
and law, MISHPAT VE-ASAKIM 67, 81–82 (2010) (Isr.) (contrasting the Abitbol ruling with
other research literature).
 47. See, e.g., CrimA. 08/990 Margi v. Dahan (May 25, 2008) (unpublished), Nevo 
Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.), https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/
Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\08\900\009\n02&fileName=08009900_n02.txt&type=4 
[https://perma.cc/ZW3J-DYZ5]. Paragraph 10 of the opinion specifically addresses a judge’s 
exposure to invalid evidence and holds the judge in the instant case could remain impartial 
and professional. Id. YIGAL MARZEL, LAWS OF DISQUALIFYING A JUDGE 299 (2006) (Isr.).
For a survey of the different views about this verdict, see CrimA 6752/97 Pridan v. State 
of Israel 51(5) PD 329, 333–35 (1997), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) 
(Isr.), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/97/520/067/A01/97067520.a01.pdf [https://perma.cc/BY9V­
Q6GW], where President Barak mentions several views without deciding among them. 
One view is that of President Agranat: “The very fact that the judge honestly believes that 
he can free himself from the preconceived notion under discussion is not compelling in the 
question of his disqualification from hearing the retrial, if only because that preconceived 
notion is likely to influence him, even subconsciously.”  B.S. 48/75 Yedid v. State of Israel 
29(2) PD 375, 383 (1975), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). Another 
view is that of President Shamgar, who maintains: “The judge has the presumption of being 
able to ignore inadmissible evidence presented to him, but this is insufficient in a case such 
as this, because the appearance of propriety is no less important to us.” CrimA 593/83 Werkstahl 
v. State of Israel 37(4) PD 614, 616 (1983), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in 
Hebrew) (Isr.).
48. CA 10771/04 Reshet Media v. Ettinger 59(3) PD 308 (2004), Nevo Legal Database
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IV. SUB JUDICE IN ISRAELI CASE LAW
As mentioned above, lately there has been ongoing debate in Israeli case 
law about the influence of media reports on the justice system. This chapter
will present the different cases where the question has been raised and the 
courts’ resulting verdicts. 
A. The Cooper Case50 
In 2010, one of Israeli television’s most prominent investigative news 
programs, Uvda, reported the story of Shimon Cooper.51 According to Uvda, 
Cooper married a few times, and each time, his wife died under mysterious
circumstances.52 In November 2012, Cooper was indicted for murdering
his wife.53 During trial, on January 14, 2013, Uvda scheduled an additional
report to air.54 This report was to include interviews with prosecution
witnesses who had not yet testified at trial.55 
Before airing the episode, Uvda sought Cooper’s response to the allegations
made in its report. Cooper, who was in custody at the time, petitioned to 
the district court for both an interlocutory and a permanent injunction to prevent 
the broadcast of the program, claiming that it violated the sub judice
prohibition.56 Cooper’s petition had a number of procedural flaws: Cooper
50.  CA 409/13 Keshet Broadcasting v. Cooper (Apr. 11, 2013) (unpublished ), Nevo
Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/13/090/004/ 
s05/13004090.s05.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JF5-VT4A].  The description of the facts is from 
sections 2–3 of President Grunis’s ruling. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. In fact, later, Cooper was indicted for the murder of another wife. Id. Cooper
was ultimately convicted for both murders. File No. 47934-11-12 DC (Central) State of
Israel v. Cooper (June 28, 2016), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.),
https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/mechozi/ME-12-11-47934-44.htm [https://perma.cc/
DFH6-Z4K4].
54. See CA 409/13 Keshet Broadcasting v. Cooper (Apr. 11, 2013) (unpublished), 
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/13/090/ 
004/s05/13004090.s05.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JF5-VT4A].
55. CC (TA) 19664-01-13 Cooper v. Keshet Broadcasting, (Jan. 14, 2013) (unpublished), 
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.), https://www-nevo-co-il.mgs­
clb.macam.ac.il/psika_html/mechozi/ME-13-01-19664-33.htm [https://perma.cc/ F4RT­
YFCT]. The court explains in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the opinion that Uvda planned to air
interviews that included interviews with Cooper’s past mistresses and anesthesiologist Dr.
Maria Zakutzky. Id.
56. CA 409/13 Keshet Broadcasting v. Cooper (Apr. 11, 2013) (unpublished), Nevo
Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/13/090/
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did not provide an affidavit to support the petition nor propose a bond to 
compensate the defendants.57 Keshet Broadcasting, the producers of the
program, opposed the petition on procedural and substantive grounds.58 
However, Keshet Broadcasting, too, did not file an opposing affidavit.59 
The State of Israel supported Cooper’s position.60 
At the hearing, the parties agreed the court should address only the petition 
for a permanent injunction.61  The court, Senior Judge Gideon Ginat presiding,
issued a permanent injunction forbidding the defendants from broadcasting 
the show.62 This ruling was appealed.63 
The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that the procedural flaws in Cooper’s 
petition justified rejection.64 Nevertheless, all justices addressed the sub 
judice issue, and these obiter dicta opinions showed the great ideological
rifts between them.65 
On one side, Justice Hayut asserted that a restraining order against a
publication is censorship, impinging on the constitutional right to free speech.66 
As such, it is restricted by the limitations on any abrogation of constitutional 
rights and a restraining order may be granted only when “there is a near-
certainty of substantial risk to the integrity of the criminal-justice process.”67 
Without this high level of probability, no restraining order against publication 
may be granted, even if it is reasonable or near-certain that the publication 
will have a substantial influence on the outcome of the criminal proceeding.68 
004/s05/13004090.s05.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JF5-VT4A].  Cooper did not base his claim
on the anticipated damage to his reputation.  It is feasible that he did not base his claim on
the Defamation Law, 5724-1965, 19 LSI 254 (1964-65) (Isr.), because he foresaw that Uvda
would claim that the publication is true, which would result in a trial that Uvda may have 
won or because existing case law practically abolished the possibility of receiving a temporary
restraining order under Defamation Law. See CA 10771/04 Reshet Media v. Ettinger, 59(3)
PD 308 (2004), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.), http://elyon1.court. 
gov.il/files/04/710/107/N01/04107710.n01.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GMS-SLXW].
57. CA 409/13 Keshet Broadcasting v. Cooper (Apr. 11, 2013) (unpublished), Nevo
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This is true even if the publisher fulfills all the other conditions of Section 
71 and the publication is likely to be a criminal offense.69 
Chief Justice Grunis did not spell out his position regarding the balance 
between the two conflicting values, but claimed that as a general rule, punishing 
forbidden speech (as sub judice) is better than the prior restraint of such 
speech.70  However, he did state (while Justice Solberg demurred),71 that
it is doubtful a civil court has the authority to issue an injunction to prevent 
the future commission of a criminal offense based on the petition of the
projected victim.72  This is a problematic opinion since civil courts may
issue a quia timet injunction—a temporary order to restrain wrongful acts 
which are threatened or imminent but have not yet commenced. Issuing a 
quia timet injunction is subject to some requirements,73 and it seems they
applied in Copper. If the court has the authority to prevent a future civil
 69. Id. Justice Hayut notes there were previous publications that related to Cooper, 
making it doubtful whether the further publication by Uvda would be significant. Id.  
These matters raise a problem related to the reality of our time, in which there will almost 
inevitably be some prior publication in the virtual domain, so a gag order for traditional
media alone is of doubtful effectiveness.  This is a difficult problem, but its resolution is
beyond our scope and requires comprehensive analysis to wrestle with the problem and
solve it. For a proposal to deal with the problem in England, see THE LAW COMMISSION,
CONTEMPT OF COURT (1): JUROR MISCONDUCT AND INTERNET PUBLICATIONS (2013), HC 860, at 
7–61 (U.K.), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/2742 
66/0860.pdf [https://perma.cc/UP88-GWXK].
70. CA 409/13 Keshet Broadcasting v. Cooper (Apr. 11, 2013) (unpublished), Nevo




73. In seeking a quia timet injunction, “the prosecutor must prove ‘real damage that 
is almost certain to occur.’”  See CA 468/81 Trust Co. Ltd. v. Orbit Medicenters Ltd., 35(4) PD
736, 736 (1981) (Isr.), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.),
https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_word/elyon/PADI-LD-4-736-L.pdf#xml=http://www.nevo.co.il/
Handlers/Highlighter/PdfHighlighter.ashx?index=0&type=Main [http://perma.cc/357D­
QUX5]; HCJ 1921/94 Soker v. Comm. for Residential and Indus. Const., 48(4) PD 237, 
262 (1994), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.), https://www.nevo.co.il/search/
Highlighter.aspx?verdictid=248138 [http://perma.cc/P7JB-EWT3].  In the Cooper case,
as explained above, if witnesses see interviews of other prosecution witnesses on the Uvda
program, it would almost inevitably influence their perception of reality and corrupt their 
testimony. Perhaps it would not lead to a wrongful conviction, but it would definitely corrupt
the criminal trial (perhaps even making the sentence more severe), which is true damage. 
Moreover, even if in the Cooper case the criteria for a quia timet injunction were not met,
this does not mean that the court does not have the authority to issue such an injunction,
but that even though it essentially has the authority to do so, in these circumstances the
conditions do not exist. 
 51







    
  






   
 
   
   
 
       
     
  
 




    
   
   
 






   
wrong, why would it not have the authority to prevent an imminent criminal 
act?74 The logic of the quia timet injunction is to allow people to defend
themselves ahead of time from a future injury caused by unlawful action,75 
and it is essentially a prophylactic measure.76 This logic applies equally 
whether the injury will result from a wrongful act or from a criminal act. 
Moreover, in most cases, committing a crime is also considered as a breach 
of statutory duty, which is a civil tort.77  In the Cooper case, violating Section
71 of the Criminal Code gave Cooper the right to sue in torts (so long as 
damage can be proven). Even accepting Grunis’s view that a civil plaintiff 
cannot obtain an injunction in order to prevent criminal behavior, if Cooper
were to note in his petition his fear of the defendants committing a tort of 
breach of statutory duty, the court would have the authority to issue a 
restraining order banning such behavior.78 In such circumstances, negating 
the court’s autority because a petitioner relied on his concern of imminent
violation of criminal law and failed to to mention that this criminal violation
is also a civil tort would seem to be meticiulous formalism.
Justice Solberg arrived at a different balance between freedom of speech 
and the right to a fair trial. In his view, one must strike a delicate balance
between them.79 Therefore, in order to protect the right to a fair trial, courts
74. To be precise, a restraining order against an alleged offender is not the opening
of a criminal proceeding against a future offender, but only the victim’s attempt to prevent
the commission of a criminal offense (which may never be committed).  Similarly, in issuing a
restraining order, at the petition of a future victim, there is no determination that the designated
offender would indeed be found guilty if they in fact acted on their intentions, but only the
desire to protect the designated victim from a future behavior that would likely endanger
them.
 75. See CA 214/89 Avneri v. Shapira, 43(3) PD 840, 851 (1989), Nevo Legal Database
(by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.), https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_word/elyon/padi-nb-3-840­
l.pdf#xml=http://www.nevo.co.il/Handlers/Highlighter/PdfHighlighter.ashx?index=0&ty
pe=Main [https://perma.cc/LM66-T3DV].
76.  CA 407/54 Bayit Meshutaf 3 v. Lampert, 10 PD 1104, 1107 (1956) (Isr.). 
77. The tort of breach of statutory duty in Israel differs from the corresponding
violations in England and the United States. This Article does not have the scope to delve
into this, but it is sufficient to note that most criminal breaches of statute which injure
another person sustain the tort as long as the offense is designed to protect that person (and 
not as part of protecting individuals in general in the country). See, e.g., CA 245/81 Sultan
v. Sultan, 38(3) PD 169, 176–79 (1984) (Isr.). 
78. CA 241/89 Avneri v. Shapira, 43(3) PD 840, 854–55 (1989), Nevo Legal Database
(by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.), https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_word/elyon/padi-nb-3-840­
l.pdf#xml=http://www.nevo.co.il/Handlers/Highlighter/PdfHighlighter.ashx?index=0&ty
pe=Main [https://perma.cc/LM66-T3DV]; HCJ 1921/94 Soker v. Comm. for Residential 
and Indus. Const., 48(4) PD 237, 262 (1994), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew)
(Isr.), https://www.nevo.co.il/search/Highlighter.aspx?verdictid=248138 [http://perma.cc/P7JB­
EWT3].
79. CA 409/13 Keshet Broadcasting v. Cooper (Apr. 11, 2013) (unpublished), Nevo
Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/13/090/004/ 
s05/13004090.s05.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JF5-VT4A]. In paragraph 2 of Justice Solberg’s 
52
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should issue restraining orders against any publication which impinges on 
the possibility of reaching a fair and just verdict.80 Justice Solberg stressed 
that the American approach, which prohibits restraint of speech, is unique 
and was not adopted by any other legal system; all other systems create a 
balance which allows the court to issue restraining orders in certain instances.81 
B. The Olmert Case 
Chief Justice Grunis also presided in the case of former Prime Minister
Ehud Olmert,82 who was tried for bribery. In the Olmert case, Chief Justice
Grunis granted the petition of Olmert’s attorneys to ban the publication of
audio recordings of Shula Zaken (Olmert’s personal assistant),83 a petition 
which was based on the sub judice prohibition.84 
This would seem to contradict Grunis’s position in Cooper, in which he 
stated that even in a case of violation of the sub judice prohibition, the 
opinion, Justice Solberg prioritizes the need to balance the freedom of expression and the 
public’s right to know with the procedures and integrity of the court system. Id.
80. CA 409/13 Keshet Broadcasting v. Cooper (Apr. 11, 2013) (unpublished), Nevo
Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/13/090/004/s05/
13004090.s05.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JF5-VT4A].
81. Id. §§ 3–7. 
82. CrimA 8080/12 State of Israel v. Ehud Olmert (June 1, 2014), Nevo Legal Database
(by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) (order prohibiting publication of cassettes), http://elyon1.
court.gov.il/files/14/800/080/x02/14080800.x02.pdf; CrimA 8080/12 State of Israel v. Ehud
Olmert (June 2, 2014) (Isr.) (order clarifying that the gag order issued for eight cassettes 
will remain in effect until the date of publication), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/12/800/
080/s17/12080800.s17.pdf; CrimA 8080/12 State of Israel v. Ehud Olmert (June 17, 2014) 
(Isr.) (order clarifying that the ban on the publication of eight recordings is currently in
effect), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/12/800/080/s18/12080800.s18.pdf. 
83. Shula Zaken was Ehud Olmert’s bureau chief, and she was prosecuted alongside 
him. At a certain point, she turned the state’s witness against him and in this context turned
over recordings of her conversations with Olmert to the prosecution. See Toi Staff, Former PM
Olmert to report to Prison Monday Morning, THE TIMES OF ISRAEL (Feb. 15, 2016), http:// 
www.timesofisrael.com/former-pm-olmert-to-report-to-prison-monday-morning/
[https://perma.cc/C73H-EALL].
84. Olmert’s attorneys wrote in their petition: “Due to the great media interest in 
publishing and broadcasting the tapes of Olmert and Zaken’s conversations, there exists a 
near-certain probability—in truth, it is an absolute certainty—that once the gag order
expires this coming Sunday, the tapes will be the lead story of every evening news program
on radio and television, immediately being disseminated to the public via every other type
of media.  In this situation, the certain publication of the tapes in the media will force the court 
to release them, and will compel it, gun to its head, to become aware of their content,
severely undermining Olmert’s right to a fair trial.” 
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tool of ex-post-facto enforcement or punishment is preferable to the
preventive measure of using gag orders. 
Grunis’s ruling in Olmert, which banned the publication of the Zaken 
tapes, supports our views. Moreover, in our opinion, there are three main
distinctions between the Cooper case and the Olmert case, which leads to
the conclusion that there were much stronger grounds for a restraining order 
in the Cooper case than in the Olmert case. 
1. In the Olmert case, the concern was that the judges might be
potentially influenced, while in the Cooper case, the concern was
that witnesses, who are not professional judges, and therefore
do not enjoy the assumption of judicial professionalism, might be
unduly influenced. In the Sheftel case,85 it was determined that
the more a publication focuses on influencing witnesses,
distinct from influencing the court itself (namely the professional 
judges), the greater the concern the publication may influence 
the legal proceeding or its results. Therefore, we would have
expected the court in the Cooper case to ban the publication.
2. In the Olmert case, the publication was about to be made
during the appellate hearing, unlike the Cooper case, in which 
the publication was made during the trial itself. When the
publication is made during an appeal (in which neither witnesses
nor evidentiary claims are presented), the risk of impermissible
influence on the appellate court is much lower.86  Indeed, recently 
the Beer-Sheba Regional Court (dealing with administrative 
matters) accepted the petition of convicted murderer Daniel 
Maoz to be interviewed by the media, even though his appeal 
is still pending.87  The court stated:
Though, as stated, a concern may exist, but we must take into consideration 
that this proceeding is not one in which witnesses will be heard or evidence
presented, but rather an appeal. We are dealing with a theoretical question, 
whether the very existence of the interview creates a substantial and near-
certain danger of impinging upon the legal proceeding which will take 
place regarding the petitioner’s matter, which is an appeal to the Supreme 
85.  HCJ 223/88 Sheftel v. Attorney General, 43(4) PD 356, 363–64 (1989) (Isr.). 
86.  Re’em Segev, Sub Judice: Freedom of Expression in Matters Under Adjudication, 
ISRAEL DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE 28–30 (2001) [hereinafter Segev]; see also New Directives
of the Attorney General, 3(2), 3, http://www.justice.gov.il/Units/YoezMespati/HanchayotNew/
Seven/41102.pdf. (“Even when the influence is directed at the court itself, one must
distinguish between the trial court and the appellate court; if it is an appellate court, the 
concern of influencing it shrinks.”). 
87. Prisoner Petition File No. 30999-09-13 (Be’er Sheva), Daniel Maoz v. IPS, § 6 
(Dec. 9, 2013), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.), https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_ 
html/minhali/MM-13-09-30999-950.htm (emphasis added). 
54
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Court. Without a substantial evidentiary framework to support this, the 
answer to this question must be negative.88 
3. The public interest in the legal proceedings against Olmert, a
former prime minster of the State of Israel, is much greater 
than the interest in the proceeding against Cooper. Olmert’s
criminal trial gripped the public, not only because of the narrow 
legal question—whether the defendant was guilty or not guilty,
and if guilty, what sentence would be appropriate—but because
of aspects extending far beyond the individual verdict.89 
In this context, we should also cite Justice Jubran’s opinion in the Katsav
case, which we will discuss shortly: 
The higher the status of the defendant, and the greater the severity of the alleged 
crime, naturally the public interest in the case will be broader, and the media
coverage will be more extensive. 
. . .
The appellant served in a public office of the first rank: President of the State of
Israel. He was the number-one citizen of our country. Due to his status and office, 
he should have clearly understood that he was under the media spotlight and the 
spotlight of the nation as a whole. His notoriety as the president of the state 
proved to be a double-edged sword for him, which pushed the publication of the 
matter far beyond that of a normal report.90 
C. The Katsav Case 
Another instance where the influence of the media arose was in the legal
proceedings against Moshe Katsav, former President and Minister, who 
was convicted of rape. In the Katsav case, Justice Salim Jubran related to 
sub judice while discussing the claims by Katsav’s defense attorneys concerning
his prejudgment in the media. 
Indeed, it is utterly inappropriate to relocate a legal proceeding to the domain of 
the media. This is likely to impinge on the purity of the judicial process and its
image . . . In this case, the media involvement has crossed every boundary, and we
should certainly be distressed by this. We hope that such a severe wrong committed
by the media . . . will vanish from the earth and never return. The scope, frequency and 
88. Id. 
89. See New Directives of the Attorney General 4(1), 3, http://www.justice.gov.il/ 
Units/YoezMespati/HanchayotNew/Seven/41102.pdf. 
90. CrimA 3372/11 Katsav v. State of Israel, §§ 393, 394 (Nov. 10, 2011), Nevo 
Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/11/720/
033/c34/11033720.c34.htm. 
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power of the reports may likely be perceived as transferring the legal proceeding to
the domain of the media.
. . .
It appears that the sub judice principle, according to which it is prohibited to
publish anything about a pending criminal matter with the intent to influence the 
judicial process or its results, was violated in the case of the appellant. Even as
the trial went on, the media published many reports, day in and day out. In this 
context, we should cite Justice E. E. Levy’s ruling (Plonit, Sec. 65): “A man may
discover in the morning that he is guilty and in the evening that he is innocent, 
depending on that day’s commentator, reporter and editor.”91 
D. Other Cases
Aside from these three central cases, there were a number of additional
cases in the past few years which have been subject to broad and
sensationalistic media coverage (“public lynching”), creating the impression 
that criminal cases are adjudicated not in the court but in the media. For 
example, the case in which Capt. R. was initially convicted, and later 
exonerated,92 from “confirming the kill” in the death of Iman Darweesh 
Al Hams93 the case of former Justice Minister Haim Ramon,94 convicted of 
forcibly kissing a female solider known as H.;95 the fatal car accident, involving 
a famous attorney Dr. Avigdor Klagsbald;96 the murder of Tair Rada, a
 91. See id. at 394. 
92. On November 15, 2005, the Military Court of the Southern Command exonerated 
the accused on all counts for the death of Iman Darweesh Al Hams.  Gabriel Motroc, Israeli 
Captain Acquitted on All Charges After Shooting Palestinian Girl 17 Times, AUSTRALIAN
NAT. REV. (Nov. 23, 2015). 
93. We killed her. I confirmed the kill too, NANA NEWS (Nov. 22, 2005), http://news. 
nana10.co.il/Article/?ArticleID=159463 [https://perma.cc/32MS-Y8YR]; Chanan Greenberg, 
The officer ‘confirmed the kill’ and shot the girl point-blank, YNET (Oct. 8, 2004), http:// 
www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-2987078,00.html [https://perma.cc/C7RS-4J7L]; Eitan
Rabin, The soldier testified: ‘Captain R. riddled the girl with bullets point-blank,’ NRG
MAARIV (Feb. 24, 2005), http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART/875/125.html [https://perma.cc/
LGC2-GU5Q].
94.  CrimA 5461/06 State of Israel v. Ramon (Mar. 29, 2007) (Isr.). 
 95. Gil Salomon, H. Testifies: This is How Ramon Harassed Me, NRG MAARIV (Oct.
17, 2006), http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/492/575.html [https://perma.cc/2J2S-N6NZ];
Tali Zinn and Miri Hasson, Relations of Authority: The Big Problem, YNET (July 25, 2006), 
http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3281164,00.html [https://perma.cc/TZ3D-3592].
96. CrimA 71933/06 Klagsbald v. State of Israel (Feb. 8, 2007) (Isr.). See generally 
Attorney Klagsbald Drank Wine Before the Accident, WALLA NEWS (Apr. 17, 2006), 
http://news.walla.co.il/item/892275 [https://perma.cc/Q5M7-HZF5]; Vered Lovitz, Klagsbald 
Found Guilty in Causing Death by Negligence; Family: ‘He Was Drunk,’ YNET (July 6, 
2006), http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3271899,00.html [https://perma.cc/BK9Z­
WN8Y]; Hadas Shefer, Perhaps Klagsbald Was Just Changing Songs on the Radio, NRG
MAARIV (July 7, 2006), http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/445/798.html [http://perma.cc/
JDQ9-A7V8].
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schoolgirl, and the subsequent conviction of Roman Zadorov;97 the case
of Daniel Maoz, convicted of murdering his parents;98 the Holy Land affair, 
a corruption case in which Olmert was one of the defendants and the
investigative news program Kolbotek published an exposé on state’s witness
Shmuel Dachner (S.D.), seemingly done to undermine his credibility;99 
the case of the popular singer Eyal Golan, who was accused of sex crimes 
against minors and subsequently convicted of tax offenses while his father
was convicted of soliciting prostitutes;100 et cetera.
In some of the cases, such as those of Capt. R., Eyal Golan and Emmanuel 
Rosen, the extensive public reverberations of the allegations, ended in a 
whimper. Although many media organizations joined the condemnatory
97. CrimA 7939/10 Zadorov v. State of Israel (Dec. 23, 2015) (Isr.).  The petition
for a retrial was denied.  Yuval Lidor, Suspect in Tair’s Murder Confesses: I Have Assaulted in
the Past, NRG MAARIV (Dec. 20, 2006), http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/520/397.html 
[https://perma.cc/MVJ6-ZTS4]; Ahiya Raved, Evidence Against Zadorov Published: ‘A 
Conviction is Likely, YNET (Jan. 15, 2007), http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3352495,00. 
html [https://perma.cc/6EE9-9ZG3]; Eli Levy, Zadorov Washed the Blood Off the Knife 
and Went Back to Work, NRG MAARIV (Jan. 17, 2007), http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/
532/164.html [http://perma.cc/W6UD-AVXZ]; Yuval Lidor & Oshrat Nagar, Zadorov 
confesses to Tair’s murder a second time, NRG MAARIV (Feb. 26, 2007), http://www.nrg.co.il/
online/1/ART1/548/909.html [https://perma.cc/CPY5-KPD2]; Sharon Rofe-Ofir, Zadorov
learned from the Internet how to slit a throat, YNET (June 17, 2007), http://www.ynet.co.il/ 
articles/0,7340,L-3413974,00.html [https://perma.cc/ZF4P-NYXC].
98. See generally File No. 54877-09-11 (Jer.) State of Israel v. Maoz (July 1, 2017), 
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.); Gilad Grossman, Allegation:
Entangled in gambling debts, he killed his parents for the inheritance, WALLA NEWS (Sept. 
21, 2011), http://news.walla.co.il/item/1862400 [https://perma.cc/JTS4-6WNG ]; Yair
Altman, He killed his parents: ‘He lost all the wedding money in poker games,’ YNET (Sept. 
21, 2011), http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4124866,00.html [https://perma.cc/ VZ4G­
H56U]; Gilad Grossman, Daniel Maoz’s sister testifies against him: ‘I thought he was involved
in the murder right away,’ WALLANEWS (Mar. 7, 2012), http://news.walla.co.il/ item/2514653 
[https://perma.cc/TT8Z-NV7F].
 99. See The face of the state witness, RESHET, http://reshet.tv/item/news/kolbotek/
season-14/episodes/video-00209703/ [https://perma.cc/YAX9-Z65K].
 100. See generally Eli Senior & Gilad Morag, Allegation against Eyal Golan: Sex 
with Minors at a Party, YNET (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L­
4455922,00.html [https://perma.cc/2DAK-KQDJ]; Matan Hetzroni & Azri Amram, Golan: ‘I
slept with a lot of women, I have no idea who among them was a minor,’ CHANNEL 2 NEWS
(Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.mako.co.il/news-law/crime/Article-f75c0a6f9f57241004.htm [http://
perma.cc/GT7P-7AJB]; Guy Peleg, Eyal Golan’s statements to police revealed, CHANNEL
2 NEWS (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.mako.co.il/news-law/crime/Article-9e0046b4f00c3
41004.htm; Golan investigation transcripts revealed, WALLA NEWs (Jan. 24, 2014), http://
news.walla.co.il/item/2714845 [https://perma.cc/8RCG-PEFF].
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chorus, either the case was closed due to insufficient evidence or the
defendant was cleared of all charges. 
On the other hand, at least in the Zadorov case, in which Roman Zadrov 
was convicted of murdering young Tair Rada, the media leaned towards 
exonerating the defendant, and the extensive media coverage may have 
actually produced a retrial (at the conclusion of which Zadorov was once 
again convicted).101  This result is problematic. If the Supreme Court was 
actually influenced to allow Zadorov a retrial by the extensive media coverage 
and not by the new evidence presented by the defense, then Zadorov was
in fact tried by the media. Just as a person whose exoneration is justified
by the evidence should be found innocent regardless of the media’s position 
concerning the case, a person whose conviction is justified by the evidence 
should be found guilty regardless of the media’s position of the case.102 
As the above cases demonstrate, even though the courts acknowledged 
the media’s possible effect on the trial’s outcome (to the extent of granting 
a retrial in the Zadorov case), they still declared that they personally were
immune to such effects and therefore the integrity of the cases were not 
breached. But, this raises the question: can judges really neutralize the 
influence of these publications while making a judicial decision? 
101. CrimA 7939/10 Zadorov v. State of Israel (Dec. 23, 2015) (Isr.).  In addition to 
this case, there is also the Amos Barnes affair in Israel.  He was convicted of murder, and
after he was freed, the media played a pivotal role in the decision to retry him.  Baruch
Kra, State Retracts 27-year-old Murder Charge Against Amos Baranes in Rachel Heller
Case, HAARETZ (Sept. 13, 2002), http://www.haaretz.com/state-retracts-27-year-old-murder­
charge-against-amos-baranes-in-rachel-heller-case-1.34267  [https://perma.cc/5HWX-ZE7Y].
However, the state decided not to retry him, which meant exoneration. Id. Similarly, Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn’s case was another instance in which the media helped to expose the truth
by raising doubts as to the reliability of the complainant.  Yuval Karniel, Who Needs the
Sub Judice Rule? Israel as a Test Case in the Relationship between Law and Media, 6 J.
MEDIA L. 96, 116 (2014).  Ultimately, the prosecution moved to dismiss the indictment.  Id.
102. In this context, we must note that Karniel is of the opinion that even though 
media involvement might theoretically violate the sub judice prohibition, in fact it forces
the justice system to follow the dictates of the law and act accordingly. Karniel, supra note
101, at 117. In his view, the media was responsible for revealing the truth (and convicting
the guilty) in the Katsav affair. Id. at 112.  Former President of Israel Katsav thought that 
only an exoneration in court could change public opinion, in whose eyes he was already
guilty and in fact a serial sex offender, and according to Karniel this is why Katsav rejected 
the plea bargain he was offered.  Id. The media was not satisfied with the plea bargain as
an end to the affair. Id. Katsav’s fatal error was his violent appearance on television, which lay
bare the naked truth. Id. at 113.  Instead of quieting the media firestorm, Katsav only
inflamed it further.  Id.  Additional complainants decided to step forward and expose more 
acts (while serving as Minister of Tourism).  Id.  Karniel believes that the saturated media 
coverage caused Katsav to turn down the plea bargain.  Id.  Katsav believed that the media 
lynching committed against him would always leave him with the public image of a serial 
sex offender.  Id. at 113–14.  His only option to restore his image was to gamble on exoneration
at the end of a full trial, a gamble which had a profound impact on his freedom.  Id. at 114. 
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V. JUDICIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND PROFESSIONAL ADJUDICATION
The doctrine of sub judice protects the purity of the criminal justice system.
The doctrine aims to prevent external media publications from influencing 
the determination of a defendant’s guilt. The Israeli legislature assumes 
that media publications can influence a legal proceeding.103 In the past, some
have doubted this assumption,104 but broad empirical literature unquestionably 
supports the proposition that exposure to post-factum publications can
alter the memory of past events.105  From the 1970s to the present day, hundreds,
perhaps thousands,106 of studies have unequivocally established that exposing 
individuals to information about a past event can influence their memories, 
without them being aware of it.107 For example, studies focusing on jurors
have found that the more exposure a given case receives in the media, the 
higher the chance that the jurors will prejudge the case and thus become
tainted by bias.108
 103. See Segal, supra note 43, at 112. 
104. See id. at 143–51. 
105. See C.A. Morgan III et al., Misinformation can influence memory for recently 
experienced, highly stressful events, 36(1) INT’L J. L. PSYCHIATRY 7 (2013); Elizabeth F.
Loftus, D. G. Miller & H. J. Burns, Semantic Integration of Verbal Information into a Visual 
Memory, 4 J. EXP. PSYCHOL. HUM. LEARN. 19 (1978). 
106. See Elizabeth F. Loftus, Searching for the Neurobiology of the Misinformation
Effect, 12 LEARN. MEM. 1, 1 (2005).
107. For a survey of the expansive empirical literature showing how external information
substantially influences the memories of eyewitnesses, see, e.g., Elizabeth F. Loftus, Planting 
misinformation in the human mind: A 30-year investigation of the malleability of memory,
12 LEARN. MEM. 361 (2005); Steblay, supra note 5. In particular, see C.A. Morgan, supra note 
105, which show that even memories of traumatic events in the past can be altered subconsciously
by being exposed to later information about the event.  This research is relevant especially
to the testimony of victims or witnesses testifying about traumatic events.  Similarly, see 
Loftus, supra note 105.  They prove that the more time that passes between the actual event and
the exposure to erroneous information, the higher the chances that the person will remember 
the erroneous information as correct information. In most cases, a lot of time passes between
the event’s occurrence, the legal proceeding and the publication of stories about it in the 
media, and thus the chances grow that the witnesses will err.  For a study that analyzes the
neurological basis of false memory, see Yoko Okado & Craig E.L. Stark, Neural activity during 
encoding predicts false memories created by misinformation, 12 LEARN. MEM. 3 (2005). 
108. See, e.g., Edmond Costantini & Joel King, The Partial Juror: Correlates and Causes 
of Prejudgment, 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 9, 36 (1981); Krause, supra note 24; Dan Simon, The 
Limited Diagnosticity of Criminal Trials, 64 VANDERBILT L. REV. 143, 189 (2011). For a 
cognitive analysis of the way irrelevant information influences both judges and jurors in
various circumstances, see Goldschmidt & Schul, supra note 46. 
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The media’s influence upon legal proceedings may occur in one of two
ways. First, witnesses’ memories may be created or changed,109 without the 
witnesses’ awareness of this alteration;110 second, judges and other decision- 
makers’ opinions may be influenced and shaped by these media reports. 
Not only are these effects very difficult to neutralize,111 but people are seldom
aware of them.112 For example, if during an interview a witness reveals
the content of her testimony and the interview is subsequently published, 
this may influence other witnesses’ memory and their recollection.113 Moreover,
if the presiding judge is exposed to this publication, it may influence his 
or her perception of the event and affect the way he or she evaluates future
admissible evidence. 
As mentioned above, extensive empirical literature proves that every bit 
of information a person is exposed to subconsciously influences every other 
piece of information exposed to, naturally changing the comprehensive 
interpretation of the event.114 
However, most Israeli case law holds that judges are immune to the external 
influence of inadmissible evidence. Judges argue that professional judges,
like themselves and unlike amateur jurors, have the capacity to set aside the 
influence of media reports.115  Jurists raise this argument, believing judges 
109. Elizabeth F. Loftus, The malleability of human memory, 67 AM. SCIENTIST 312,
313 (1979); ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 55, 60 (1979); Elizabeth F. 
Loftus, Imagining the past, 14 THE PSYCHOLOGIST 584, 586–87 (2001). 
110. Maryanne Garry, Charles G. Manning, Elizabeth F. Loftus & Steven J. Sherman,
Imagination inflation: Imagining a childhood event inflates confidence that it occurred, 3 
PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 208, 209 (1996); Elizabeth F. Loftus & Jacqueline E. Pickrell,
The Formation of False Memories, 25 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 720, 723–24 (1995); Giuliana
Mazzoni & Amina Memon, Imagination can create false autobiographical memories, 14
PSYCHOL. SCI. 186, 188 (2003).
111. Hedy Red Dexter, Brian L. Cutler & Gary Moran, A Test of Voir Dire as a Remedy 
for the Prejudicial Effects of Pretrial Publicity, 22 J. OF APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 819, 829– 
30 (1992).
112.  Gary Moran & Brian L. Cutler, The prejudicial impact of pretrial publicity, 21
J. OF APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 345, 362–63 (1991).
 113. Cf. Criminal Procedure Law, 1982-5742, ¶ 172 (amended) (Isr.) (which forbids 
a witness from being present when another witness testifies).
114. See, e.g., CA 409/13 Keshet Broadcasting v. Cooper (Apr. 11, 2013) (unpublished),
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/ 
13/090/004/s05/13004090.s05.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JF5-VT4A]; CA 214/89 Avneri v.
Shapira 43(3) PD 840, 851 (1989), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) 
(Isr.), https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_word/elyon/padi-nb-3-840-l.pdf#xml=http://www.nevo.co.il/
Handlers/Highlighter/PdfHighlighter.ashx?index=0&type=Main [https://perma.cc/LM66-T3DV];
CA 407/54 Bayit Meshutaf 3 v. Lampert, 10 PD 1104, 1107 (1956) (Isr.).  See also Helen 
M. Paterson & Richard I. Kemp, Comparing Methods of Encountering Post-event Information: 
The Power of Co-witness Suggestion, 20 APPL. COGNIT. PSYCHOL. 1083, 1083 (2006).
 115. Segal, supra note 43, at 143–48 and the references cited therein.
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have the ability to overcome the influence of media reports due to their 
“legal education and [. . .] by way of their judicial service.”116 
This argument is problematic and lacks empirical evidence. Research
on psychological biases of judges demonstrates that judges are generally
unsuccessful in neutralizing the influence of outside media reports.117 
Moreover, research has demonstrated the effects of exposure to media reports
on human memory in many varied segments of the population.118 Empirical
research shows that exposure to misleading data leads to errors, at varying 
levels, among all people,119 regardless of the fact that such influence is 
forbidden.120  Therefore, the burden of empirically proving that judges can 
116. Id. at 146. 
117. See, e.g., Birte Englich, Thomas Mussweiler & Fritz Strack, Playing Dice with 
Criminal Sentences: The Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on Experts’ Judicial Decision Making, 
32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 188 (2006); Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie 
& Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of
Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U.PA.L.REV. 1251 (2005); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski 
& Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001); Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, L.H. Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Does Unconscious Racial Bias
Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009); Goldschmidt & Goldschmidt
& Schul, supra note 46, at 86–89. 
118. See Loftus, Planting misinformation, supra note 107, at 362–63. 
119. See, e.g. CA 409/13 Keshet Broadcasting v. Cooper (Apr. 11, 2013) (unpublished), 
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/13/090/ 
004/s05/13004090.s05.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JF5-VT4A].  For a survey of studies showing
that even the memories of infants and non-human biological species may be influenced by
later erroneous information, see Loftus, Planting misinformation, supra note 107, at 362– 
63. In addition to the abovementioned, it is worth noting that there are factors that make 
the judges relatively susceptible to the possibility of being influenced by exposure to later
erroneous information. For example, as time passes between the true and erroneous information,
the odds increase that the person will be confused between true and erroneous information, 
and the erroneous information may be remembered as true.  Phillip A. Higham, Believing 
details known to have been suggested, 89 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 265, 265 (1998).  First, in most 
circumstances (particularly in major cases), judges write their opinions long after the 
information has been publicized in the media, and thus the chances that media reports will 
influence their memory increase.  Second, in Israel, most judges are in their sixties or seventies.
Age is significant on this issue because memory begins to fade when someone gets older;
thus an older judge is more likely to falsely “remember” erroneous information and believe 
it as accurate. See Mara E. Karpel, William J. Hoyer & Michael P. Toglia, Accuracy and 
Qualities of Real and Suggested Memories: Nonspecific Age Differences, 56 J. GERONTOL.
PSYCHOL. SCI. 103, 103, 107–08 (2001).  For the similarities among judges and other people, 
in the context of Israel, see Issi Rosen-Zvi, Are Judges Human? The Construction of the 
Image of the Professional Judge in Light of Judicial Disqualification Rules, 8 MISHPAT 
UMIMSHAL 49, 82–84 (2005), and the many references cited therein. 
120. The odds of being misled by erroneous information may be reduced if the individual 
is warned before being exposed to the information that it may be misleading.  See Edith 
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neutralize the subconscious effects of exposure to media reports on their 
decision, and that it is not simply the whim of jurists to see their colleagues 
as superior and beyond reproach, lies upon those who embrace this claim.
Barring any empirical evidence showing significant distinction between
judges and jurors, it is exceedingly problematic to rely on this claim.
Moreover, judges themselves have expressed the view that they are not
better than their fellow human beings and are equally susceptible to influential
information. For example, former Justice (later President of the Supreme
Court) Aharon Barak stated in the Azoulay case that even professional judges
are mere flesh-and-blood human beings likely to be influenced by the nature
of the (biased) coverage in the press: 
The judge, despite her ethics and propriety, despite the spine and fundamental principles
which shape her judgment, remains, at the end of the day, a human being. This is
both her strength and her weakness. This is the reality, and it must be observed
with eyes wide open. Therefore, we must recognize the reasonable possibility that 
a professional judge may be influenced.121 
President of the Israeli Press Council and former Supreme Court Justice, 
Dalia Dorner, shares this view that the media has a subconscious influence 
on a judge’s reasoning: 
I am confident that a judge has courage and fortitude, but the subconscious influence 
of the media on judges nevertheless gets under the judges’ skin. Therefore the
press must limit themselves of their own volition.122 
We give the final word to American Judge Richard Posner (Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals) who eloquently describes in his book the issue of influencing 
judges: 
Through self-awareness and discipline, a judge can learn not to allow his sympathies
or antipathies to influence his judicial votes––unduly. But the qualification in
“unduly” needs to be emphasized. Many judges would say that nothing “outside
the law,” in the narrow sense that confines the word to the texts of formal legal 
documents, influences their judicial votes at all. Some of them are speaking for
Greene, M.S. Flynn & E.F. Loftus, Inducing Resistance to Misleading Information, 21 J.
VERBAL LEARN. VERBAL BEHAV. 207, 208 (1982).  Therefore, in situations in which the 
judge is aware of exposure to evidence that may be inadmissible (e.g., confidential evidence or
late evidence), the odds of being influenced by invalid evidence is relatively small in practice. 
However, the odds are high that a judge may be exposed to media reports (television, internet,
newspapers, etc.) characterized by Section 71 of the Courts Law at least in part, before the
judge realize the information relates to a pending case, and thus the judge cannot prepare 
themselves ahead of time, but only ex post facto.  Cf. CA. 844/06 Zvi Bialostotsky v. Bank
of Jerusalem, 6 (Nov. 26, 2007), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). 
Since this warning is not effective, the chance of being misled increases.
121. CA 3203/91Azoulay v. Azoulay, Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew)
(Isr.).
122. Ruti Avraham, How Does the Media Influence Judges?, ARUTZ SHEVA (Israel
National News) (Dec. 25, 2006, 2:06 PM), http://www.inn.co.il/News/News.aspx/157695. 
62
SHNOOR-MENASHE (DO NOT DELETE) 2/27/2018 10:33 AM     
 
   
 
   
  


















        
   
 
    
  
  
   
  
  
[VOL. 19:  39, 2017] Sub Judice and Free Speech 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
public consumption, and know better. Those who are speaking sincerely are fooling
themselves.123 
VI. EVALUATING ISRAELI RULINGS
Our criminal system is designed so the police investigates; the district or 
state attorney prosecutes; and the judges decide cases after the defendant 
has had his day in court represented by a defense attorney who seeks to protect
the defendant’s rights during the process. This process is quite different
than investigative journalism.
Investigative journalism is a troubling phenomenon. The reporter is the 
investigator, the judge, the jury, and the executioner, and the verdict is 
carried out publicly. Is the media performing its role responsibly? Or has 
the desire for high ratings motivated the press to conduct a drumhead court- 
martial, making it so that the public finds the accused guilty, even though 
the matter is still pending before the court? Is not every person, even one 
suspected of a crime, entitled on the basis of human dignity to present their 
case before the court, and only there? This concern becomes even more
acute in a case, such as Cooper, where the prosecutor (the State of Israel)
and the prosecuted (Shimon Cooper) share the common view: broadcasting
interviews with key prosecution witnesses in an investigative news program 
is likely to influence justice. 
Our criticism of Israeli case law in this Article is based on the principle 
of “criminal decision-making strategy.”124  The principle of this view
establishes that every critical juncture of a criminal trial, and even beyond
it, both at the legislative and the judicial level must take into account the 
possibility that decisions will increase the risk of convicting the innocent. 
The criminal decision-making strategy must be a guiding principle for shaping
both laws and judicial decisions.
 123. RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 130 (2013). 
124. Doron Menashe, Judicial Discretion in Fact-Finding, Freedom of Proof, and 
Professionalism of the Courts, 43 HAPRAKLIT: ISR. B. L. REV. 83, 90–91, 114, 122–26 
(1993) (Isr.); Doron Menashe, The Ideal of Finding Truth and the Principle of Minimizing
False Convictions: An Analysis of a Complex Relations, 1 KIRYAT MISHPAT 307, 307–11
(2001) (Isr.); see generally DORON MENASHE, THE LOGIC OF ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
(The Magnes Press & the University of Haifa Press, 2009) (Isr.); ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS 
OF EVIDENCE LAW 172–77 (2005). But see LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL 
LAW: AN ESSAY ON LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY 36–38, 215–16 (2006). For analysis of the different 
approaches of Stein and Laudan, see Ronald J. Allen, Laudan, Stein, and the Limits of 
Theorizing About Juridical Proof, 29 L. & PHIL. 195, 195–230 (2010) (book review). 
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Therefore, once such a risk-increasing junction has been identified, the 
legislature and judges have the obligation to reduce the risk of wrongful
conviction even by limiting free speech if necessary. Although the social
value of allowing publication is very high, the attorney general will generally
not dismiss an indictment and exonerate an offender in order to allow the 
publication. If the publication cannot justify the social cost incurred by
exonerating a defendant who may be guilty, it surely cannot justify the far 
heavier and more undesirable social cost of possibly convicting an innocent 
person. 
Moreover, courts must consider the jurisprudential aspect involved in 
the risk of a wrongful conviction as part of the larger principle of protecting
the innocent, which is based on the universal idea of presumption of innocence.
The presumption of innocence recognizes the human tendency to prejudge; 
however, the guilt or innocence of the accused should be determined only 
by judicial discretion (ignoring any media coverage which may produce a 
premature verdict). In our view, judicial discretion also requires the court
to actively assume that every criminal defendant is presumed innocent.
Therefore, judicial discretion requires reducing the risks of wrongful conviction 
(without precluding the possibility of finding the defendant guilty; the defendant
has a presumption of innocence, not sweeping immunity preventing conviction 
in a criminal case).
The principle of protecting the innocent may also be achieved by logically 
broadening the standard of proof in criminal law, in such a way to create 
broad margins of protection against wrongful conviction. According to this 
approach, the limitation of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, applied
only to determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant, is likely to preclude 
the application of the values undergirding this standard. It is evident that 
applying the standard narrowly may turn out to be “too little” or “too late” 
in terms of protecting the innocent from the risk of false conviction that 
criminal proceedings and the various procedural and evidential rules are
liable to create. 
Therefore, in our view, courts must first and foremost take into account 
the risk of wrongfully convicting the innocent when interpreting the criminal
norm stipulated in Section 71 of the Courts Act. The purpose of Section 
71 is to protect the independence, self-sufficiency and freedom of the judicial 
branch from all external influence or prejudice. The protection that this 
criminal standard provides to the judicial proceeding includes protection
against invalid influence or negative bias that could cause the court to convict
defendants who would otherwise have been exonerated. Preventing wrongful 
conviction is the central aim of the sub judice rule, which the court must
certainly make its guiding light. 
In our view, whenever there is a genuine concern of potential influence 
upon witnesses at trial, as in the Cooper case, there is no convincing counter­
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argument and publication should be banned. Even if one accepts the claim 
that judicial professionalism suffices to ignore the “background noise” and 
the judicial proceeding can continue without becoming “contaminated” (an 
assertion that we do not accept), the situation is completely different when
it comes to influencing witnesses.
Exposing witnesses to information which might influence their memories 
and decision-making, cannot be disregarded as they are not bound by
judicial professionalism. In other words, even if a professional judge may
justify the non-restraint of sub judice publications, this theory does not appease 
the concern of impermissible influence on witnesses, who are “the weak
link” in the chain of determining facts in judicial proceedings.125 Publicizing 
essential facts during the preliminary stage of a criminal proceeding (before 
the trial begins) may dissuade witnesses from testifying at all. It could also 
“refresh” their memories of the events, so that their testimony is not based 
on what they personally saw or heard, but rather on what was planted in their 
heads. This may impact the determination of verifiable facts at trial, thereby 
damaging the entire judicial proceeding. 
Based on the “criminal decision-making strategy” viewpoint and the fear 
of wrongfully convicting the innocent, the most fitting test for sub judice 
violations should be the reasonable possibility test. This test is not predicated 
on cardinal probability, but rather on a comparative one. For that sake that
it is enough that there exists a scenario in which the publication having an 
impermissible influence on the trial outcome and such scenario is more
probable or at least not less probable than the other scenarios 
This test refers to the possible sequence of events based on human judgment,
as opposed to a pure speculation or general hypotheses, which are in principle
both irrefutable, that the defendant would be convicted due to the publication
having an impermissible influence on the presiding judge or the witnesses 
that are to testify at trial. Whenever such a possibility exists, there is reason 
to prevent the publication, regardless of any connection to the expression
under discussion.
If publication is essential, the prosecution can proceed with publication 
if it exonerates the defendant. If the prosecution does not do so and is prepared
to give up the right to freedom of speech (e.g. choose to pass on the publication
 125. Segal, supra note 43, at 143–48; see also CrimA 126/62 Disenchik v. Attorney
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or broadcast), then the criminal prosecution admits it would rather avoid 
exonerating an offender over exercising the right to freedom of speech.
However, if freedom of speech does not justify the cost of exonerating an 
offender, how could it possibly justify the price of wrongfully convicting 
the innocent? 
Moreover, supporting the reasonable-possibility test is crucial, at least
in cases in which there is a possibility of influencing witnesses. The risk
of such influence is what motivated Justice Yoel Sussman in the Disenchik
case,126 the first case to enforce the sub judice violation in Israel. In Disenchik, 
a murder case, the defense attorney pled “not guilty” to the judge’s question 
before the defendant could plead for himself. The next day, the Maariv 
newspaper published an article reporting that the defendant had confessed
to the reporter before the trial, but this confession was not binding. The
magistrate’s court exonerated the defendants (the reporter and his editor), 
but the district court accepted the state’s appeal and convicted them for
sub judice. The Supreme Court affirmed.
The main justification for the conviction was that the publication would
likely influence witnesses’ testimonies at trial because the evidence would 
be eyewitness identification. On the one hand, publishing the defendant’s
confession was likely to strengthen the confidence of the eyewitness that
the defendant was the one who shot the victim. However, on the other 
hand, an eyewitness who would have testified on the defendant’s behalf 
would likely be dissuaded from testifying after reading in the newspaper that 
the defendant had already confessed to committing the charged offense.
Additionally, in the Cooper case, publishing a series of interviews with central
witnesses before testimony had been heard in court, was likely to influence
the other witnesses’ memories (even if unconsciously), as that their testimony
would mold to become closer to the versions presented on television. 
In the Disenchik case, Justice Sussman ruled that the publication of the
confession made to the reporter would likely influence the witnesses who 
were supposed to testify at trial. 
However, Judge Sussman avoided ruling on whether the article had the 
potential of influencing the judges. Justice Sussman was ready to assume
for the benefit of the appellants that an Israeli court—as it is composed of 
professional judges, unlike the Anglo-American system, in which non­
professional jurors determine the facts—is not as susceptible to external
influences. Additionally, professional judges can ignore news reports, just 
as they ignore inadmissible evidence that they may sometimes come across. 
However, Judge Sussman expressed reservations, noting that even professional
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judges may be susceptible to external influences (mainly when it comes
to weighing evidence), as even the court itself is not an “automatic” judging
mechanism.127 
In contrast, Justice Zvi Berenzon, with whom Justice Moshe Landau
concurred, stressed the danger of influencing judges. When such a report
is published, it necessarily penetrates the consciousness of every reader, 
even if that reader is a professional judge presiding over the case, it still 
forms a belief of whether the defendant is guilty. Even professional judges
are only flesh and blood, and they are likely to be unduly influenced, even 
if only subconsciously. Therefore, such a publication may cause the verdict 
to be based, in part, on forbidden external influences rather than on legitimate
evidence.128 
The concern of impermissible influence on trial witnesses also arose in 
the Haim Ramon case, which dealt with a former justice minister convicted 
of forcibly kissing a female soldier. The court held:
We cannot conclude this trial without relating to the media. In our view, every red line
has been crossed in this case, sub judice dragged to depths never seen previously. 
The content of testimonies was published by the media before the witnesses had 
testified, and thus we learned, in a number of cases, that the testimony was contaminated.
The prohibition against publishing the complainant’s testimony was brazenly violated
by a word-by-word report of the confrontation, which was an integral part of the 
testimony. Evidence from the case, including photographs, were publicly disseminated, 
before the court could rule. The various media made perverse use of polygraph 
tests for the final three defense witnesses, in an attempt to create in the public the 
feeling that the trial was taking place in the media and not in the courthouse. Our
feeling was that attempts were made, sometimes through hidden messages and
sometimes openly, to pervert justice. We disregarded this. We judges have only the 
dictate of our conscience, and that alone is what directs us.129 
We cannot conclude this chapter without noting the research of Professor 
Daniel Kahneman, Nobel Prize winner in Economics, regarding cognitive
biases and judicial verdicts.130  Kahneman’s research supports the general
conclusion that judges are in fact flesh and blood, sensitive to external 
127. Id. at 175. 
128. Id. at 183–88. 
129. CrimA 5461/06 State of Israel v. Ramon (Jan. 31, 2007), Nevo Legal Database
(by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) (news coverage influences murder case).
130. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974); Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1982); KAHNEMAN DANIEL, THINKING FAST
AND SLOW, (Farber et al. eds., 2011).
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influence more than they think or are aware (or are ready to admit).131 
According to Kahneman, the danger of influence increases among those 
who consider themselves professional judges, unsusceptible to external
influence. Supreme effort is required to evince doubt and sweep away a 
fact which one wishes to ignore. Those who believe that no such effort is 
necessary are those most likely to be influenced by such a fact.
VII. A NEW MODEL
In this Article, we reviewed the sub judice rule, its history, and the problems 
judges face when deciding whether, and to what extent, to grant a gag order. 
We examined several models that could mitigate external influences; yet 
in our view, none offers a satisfactory and enforceable solution. 
Determining what attitude to adopt with regard to investigative journalism 
concerning criminal cases requires balancing between two competing values. 
On the one hand, modern democratic society has an interest in investigative
journalism regarding criminal matters that exposes the oversights of the
police, prosecution, and courts. Such journalism is an essential part
of democracy. On the other hand, media articles related to pending criminal 
cases raise serious fears of perverting criminal justice, either because the
media reports subconsciously prejudice the judges, or because they influence 
witnesses’ memories and testimonies.
This problem has troubled many legal systems in the past few decades.
An ocean separates the views of the United Kingdom and the United States.
The U.K. stresses the danger of undermining justice, and is prepared, for
the sake of purity of the judicial process, to restrain the media significantly, 
while the U.S. believes free speech is more highly valued as a basic freedom,
even if it increases the danger of “trial by media.” Either way, no one disputes 
the media’s major influence over public opinion and (indirectly) the courts 
as well.
Israeli jurisprudence forbids publishing anything that tends to influence 
a criminal proceeding. However, this legislation is not implemented in 
practice and thus remains a dead letter. In turn, the current state of affairs
does not protect criminal proceedings as the legislature intended. Nevertheless,
sub judice remains an important tool in reducing the risk of wrongful
convictions. The recent calls to strike down Section 71 of the Courts Law132 
131. Hemi Bin-Nun, Cognitive biases and judicial decisions: systematic thinking and
intuition in the judge’s work, 5 SHA’AREI MISHPAT 177, 179–80 (5770-2010). 
132.   Israeli Supreme Court Justice Esther Hayut stressed at a conference on the 
theme of “Litigation, Media and Practicality” that sub judice should perhaps be discarded
due to its becoming a “dead letter.” Yuval Yoaz, Hayut: ‘The sub judice prohibition has 
become a dead letter; we should consider eliminating it,’ GLOBES (July 8, 2013, 2:33 PM), 
www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000860316) [https://perma.cc/E7BL-GQUW] 
68
SHNOOR-MENASHE (DO NOT DELETE) 2/27/2018 10:33 AM     
 
















   
    
   
 
    
  
 




        
 
[VOL. 19:  39, 2017] Sub Judice and Free Speech 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
are without merit, and they demonstrate indifference to the danger of wrongful 
convictions. Moreover, abolishing the doctrine of sub judice may invalidate 
a vital, essential tool that allows courts to deal with the troubling phenomenon 
of a trial by media.
In order to prevent wrongful convictions, we must prevent the prejudices 
of sub judice publications from taking place in the first place, and craft
appropriate regulation that would better protect the judicial proceeding 
from forbidden external influences. Once the Attorney General applies the
sub judice prohibition effectively and consistently, the media will educate 
itself about the dangers of sub judice publication, and the difficulties of 
enforcement will naturally be lessened. Indeed, enforcing this law and
maintaining the purity of the criminal law process is not simple. However,
lack of enforcement of the sub judice rule in the criminal sphere, in and 
of itself, does not compel the conclusion that the doctrine should be removed
from the Israeli corpus of law; instead, it may simply call for greater
enforcement.
The only issue that must be addressed is the proper balance between freedom 
of speech and the need to guarantee that the defendant’s fate will be 
decided within the walls of the courthouse and nowhere else. Therefore,
in our view, Judge Ginat was correct in the holding of the Cooper case:
The appropriate place to determine the defendant’s guilt is only in the criminal
courthouse. Creating another forum in which some of the evidence will be presented,
in a dramatic, attractive fashion impinges, without a doubt, on the capacity of the 
defendant and on the capacity of the prosecutor to present the issues in a full way,
pursuant to the rules of evidence in a criminal court.133 
However, given the need to protect freedom of expression and the desire 
to create a clear rule, we suggest a new type of sub judice rule. We suggest 
shifting away from the probability test (deciding the probability and extent 
of a publication’s effect on a criminal proceeding), and instead focus on 
the content of a publication. 
Today, the central question that must be decided in prosecuting sub judice
is whether it is near-certainty or reasonable possibility that the press will
(“Must we arraign every day? Must we renew the enforcement? There really is nothing to 
restore, since enforcement never existed. We always approached enforcement on tiptoe. I 
am not confident that we must keep this criminal standard. I have my thoughts about this 
matter, and we need to reconsider it.”).
133. CA 409/13Cooper v. Keshet Broadcasting Ltd. 1, 8–9 (Apr. 1, 2013) Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.), https://www.law.co.il/media/computer-law/ 
keshet1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Z6S-PDEY].
 69












    
 
    
  
 
have a hard time deciding in advance how the prosecution and the court 
will view the intended publication. Therefore, in our view, it may be
beneficial to approach this topic differently by utilizing another judicial 
test, one which analyzes the content of the publication without determining 
the probability of its effect on the pending criminal proceeding. 
We suggest adopting a new, revolutionary restricted model that prohibits 
two kinds of publications determined to arouse real concern regarding
witness testimony as well as likelihood of judicial error (even if the judge 
is a professional one): (A) publications of admissible or inadmissible 
evidence related to the offense before it has been presented in court;134 
and (B) publications of interviews with litigants or witnesses scheduled to
testify at trial.135 
We believe that by converting the general prohibition to a defined prohibition 
of specific publications, chances of enforcing this rule will increase, thus 
preventing the current situation, in which the existing criminal prohibition 
rule is not enforced and the accused are at risk of wrongful convictions. 
The chance of maintaining a criminal prohibition, in its confined form, will
prevent trial-by-media and guarantee the interest of the accused without
impinging unnecessarily on freedom of expression or freedom of the press. 
134. See Guidelines of the Attorney General (Guidelines for Plaintiffs on the Prosecution 
of the Sub Judice Offense), 5762-2002, Directive No. 51.051, A(3) 2 (Isr.) (“Publishing 
evidence inadmissible in court.”).
135. See Historical Guidelines of the Attorney General Criminal Law (Instructions 
to Plaintiffs Regarding the Prosecution of Sub Judice), 5752-1992, Directive No. 51.051, 
2(3) (repealed 2003) (Isr.) [https://perma.cc/X9B9-LEWR] (“Publishing an interview with 
litigants or witnesses supposed to testify at trial, or publishing the accounts of these individuals,
not including publishing in good faith something which was stated or which occurred in a 
public session of the court.”). 
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